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Abstract
Predicate encryption is a new type of public key encryption that enables searches on encrypted data.
By using predicate encryption, we can search keywords or attributes on encrypted data without decrypt-
ing ciphertexts. Hidden vector encryption (HVE) is a special kind of predicate encryption. HVE supports
the evaluation of conjunctive equality, comparison, and subset operations between attributes in cipher-
texts and attributes in tokens. In this paper, we construct efficient HVE schemes in prime order bilinear
groups derived from previous HVE schemes in composite order bilinear groups, and prove their selective
security under simple assumptions. To achieve this result, we present a conversion method that trans-
forms HVE schemes from composite order bilinear groups into prime order bilinear groups. Our method
supports any types of prime order bilinear groups and uses simple assumptions.
Keywords: Searchable encryption, Predicate encryption, Hidden vector encryption, Conversion method,
Bilinear maps.
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1 Introduction
Searchable public key encryption is a new type of public key encryption (PKE) that enables efficient search-
ing on encrypted data [3]. In PKE, if an agent A wants to search on encrypted data for a user B, he should
first decrypt ciphertexts using the private key SK of the user B. This simple method has a problem that the
agent requires the user’s private key. In searchable public key encryption, a ciphertext is associated with
keywords or attributes, and a user can generate a token for searching from the user’s private key. That is, an
agent A performs searches on encrypted data using the token T K that is related with keywords or attributes
instead of using the private key SK. By using searchable public key encryption, it is possible to build in-
teresting systems like privacy preserving mail gateway systems [3], secure audit log systems [25], network
audit log systems [21], and credit card payment gateway systems [7].
Predicate encryption (PE) is a generalization of searchable public key encryption [7, 14]. In PE, a
ciphertext is associated with an attribute x, and a token is associated with a predicate f . At first, a sender
creates a ciphertext that is associated with an attribute x, and an agent receives a token that corresponds to
a predicate f from a receiver. If f (x) = 1, then the agent can decrypt ciphertexts that are related with x.
Otherwise, that is f (x) = 0, then the agent cannot get any information except that f (x) = 0. That is, PE
provides both message hiding and attribute hiding properties. Hidden vector encryption (HVE) is a special
kind of PE [7]. In HVE, a ciphertext and a token are associated with attribute vectors x,y respectively, and
the attribute vector for the token contains a special wild card attribute. If each attribute of a ciphertext is
equal with the attribute of a token except the wild card attribute, then the predicate fy(x) is satisfied. HVE
supports the evaluation of predicates such that conjunctive equality, conjunctive subset, and conjunctive
comparison.
Many HVE schemes were originally proposed in composite order bilinear groups [7,16,22]. To improve
the efficiency of HVE schemes, HVE schemes in prime order bilinear groups are required. Although many
HVE schemes in prime order groups were constructed from scratch [13, 18, 19], we would like to easily
obtain HVE schemes in prime order groups from previous schemes in composite order groups. The previous
conversion methods that convert cryptographic schemes from composite order to prime order bilinear groups
are Freeman’s method [9] and Ducas’ method [8]. The method of Ducas is that random blinding elements
in ciphertexts can be eliminated in asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order since the decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in asymmetric bilinear groups. The method of Freeman is that product
groups and vector orthogonality provide the subgroup decision assumption and the subgroup orthogonality
property in prime order bilinear groups, respectively. The merit of this method is that it can convert many
cryptographic schemes from bilinear groups of composite order to asymmetric bilinear groups of prime
order. The demerits of this method are that the converted scheme only works in asymmetric bilinear groups
and the security of the scheme is proven under complex assumptions.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we present a new conversion method that transforms HVE schemes from composite order
bilinear groups into prime order bilinear groups.
Our conversion method is similar to the conversion method of Freeman [9] since it uses product groups
and vector orthogonality, but ours has the following three differences. The first difference is that Freeman’s
method is related to the subgroup decision (SD) assumption in prime order bilinear groups, whereas our
method is not related to the SD assumption. The second difference is that Freeman’s method only works
in asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order, whereas our method works in any bilinear groups of prime
order. The third difference is that cryptographic schemes that are converted from Freeman’s method use
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complex assumptions that depend on complex basis vectors, whereas HVE schemes that are converted from
our method use simple assumptions that are independent of basis vectors.
By using our conversion method, we first convert the HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters [7] in composite
order bilinear groups into an HVE scheme in symmetric bilinear groups of prime order. We then prove the
converted HVE scheme is selectively secure under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) and the
parallel 3-party Diffie-Hellman (P3DH) assumptions. Next, we also convert the delegatable HVE scheme
of Shi and Waters [22] and the efficient HVE scheme of Lee and Lee [16] from composite order bilinear
groups to HVE schemes in symmetric bilinear groups of prime order. Finally, we show that the new P3DH
assumption holds in generic group model introduced by Shoup.
1.2 Related Work
PE is closely related to functional encryption [6]. In functional encryption, a ciphertext is associated with
attributes x, and a private key is associated with a function f . The main difference between PE and func-
tional encryption is that the computation of a predicate f (x) ∈ {0,1} is only allowed in PE whereas the
computation of any function f (x) is allowed in functional encryption. Identity-based encryption (IBE) is
the most simple type of functional encryption, and it provide an equality function for an identity in cipher-
texts [4]. Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) is an extension of IBE, and it provides a conjunctive equality function
for a hierarchical identity in ciphertexts [11]. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is also an extension of IBE,
and it provides the most general function that consists of AND, OR, NOT, and threshold gates [12].
The first HVE scheme was proposed by Boneh and Waters [7]. After their construction, various HVE
schemes were proposed in [8, 16, 22]. A simple HVE scheme can be constructed from a PKE scheme
[3, 7, 15]. This method was introduced by Boneh et al. [3] to construct a PKE scheme with keyword search
(PEKS) using trapdoor permutations. After that, Boneh and Waters showed that a searchable public key
encryption for general predicates also can be constructed from this method [7]. Katz and Yerukhimovich
[15] showed that it is possible to construct a PE scheme from a PKE scheme if the number of predicate is
less than a polynomial number of a security parameter. The main idea of this method is to use a multiple
instances of key-private PKE introduced by Bellare et al. [1]. That is, the public key of searchable public
key encryption consists of the public keys of key-private PKE and each instance of public keys is mapped
to each predicate. However, this method has a serious problem that the total number of predicates is limited
to the polynomial value of a security parameter.
Another HVE scheme can be constructed by extremely generalizing anonymous IBE (AIBE) [7, 8, 13,
16,19,22]. This method was introduced by Boneh and Waters [7]. They used the IBE scheme of Boneh and
Boyen [2] and composite order bilinear groups to provide the anonymity of ciphertexts. Shi and Waters con-
structed a delegatable HVE scheme [22]. Lee and Lee constructed an efficient HVE scheme with a constant
number of pairing operations [16]. In composite order bilinear groups, the random blinding property using
subgroups provides the anonymity of ciphertexts and the orthogonal property among subgroups provides
the successful decryption. However, it is inefficient to use composite order bilinear groups since the group
order of composite order bilinear groups should be large. To overcome this problem of inefficiency, Freeman
presented a general framework that converts cryptographic schemes from composite order bilinear groups
to prime order bilinear groups [9]. Ducas also showed that HVE schemes in composite order bilinear groups
are easily converted to schemes in prime order bilinear groups [8]. However, these conversion methods
result in asymmetric bilinear groups.
Finally, an HVE scheme can be derived from inner-product encryption (IPE) [14, 18, 20]. IPE is a kind
of PE and it enable the evaluation of inner-product predicates between the vector of ciphertexts and the
vector of tokens. Katz et al. [14] constructed the first IPE scheme under composite order bilinear groups.
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Okamoto and Takashima constructed an hierarchical IPE scheme using dual pairing vector spaces [18]. Park
proposed an IPE scheme under prime order bilinear groups and proved its security under the well-known
assumptions [20]. The main idea of converting an IPE scheme to an HVE scheme is to construct a predicate
of conjunctive equality using a predicate of inner product [14].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we define hidden vector encryption, and introduce bilinear groups of prime order and two
complexity assumptions.
2.1 Hidden Vector Encryption
Let Σ be a finite set of attributes and let ∗ be a special symbol not in Σ. Define Σ∗ = Σ∪{∗}. The star ∗
plays the role of a wild-card or “don’t care” value. For a vector ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σℓ) ∈ Σℓ∗, we define a predicate
f~σ over Σℓ as follows: For ~x = (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ Σℓ, it set f~σ (~x) = 1 if ∀i : (σi = xi or σi = ∗), it set f~σ (~x) = 0
otherwise.
Definition 2.1 (Hidden Vector Encryption). An HVE scheme consists of four algorithms Setup, GenToken,
Encrypt, and Query which are defined as follows:
Setup(1λ , ℓ): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ and the length parameter ℓ. It
outputs a public key PK and a secret key SK.
GenToken(~σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σℓ) ∈ Σℓ∗ that
corresponds to a predicate f~σ , the secret key SK and the public key PK. It outputs a token T K~σ for
the vector ~σ .
Encrypt(~x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector~x = (x1, . . . ,xℓ)∈ Σℓ, a message M ∈M,
and the public key PK. It outputs a ciphertext CT for~x and M.
Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT , a token T K~σ for a vector ~σ
that corresponds to a predicate f~σ , and the public key PK. It outputs M if f~σ (~x) = 1 or outputs ⊥
otherwise.
The scheme should satisfy the following correctness property: For all~x∈Σℓ, M ∈M, ~σ ∈Σℓ∗, let (PK,SK)←
Setup(1λ , ℓ), CT ← Encrypt(~x,M,PK), and T K~σ ← GenToken(σ ,SK,PK).
• If f~σ (~x) = 1, then Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) = M.
• If f~σ (~x) = 0, then Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
Definition 2.2 (Selective Security). The selective security of HVE is defined as the following game between
a challenger C and an adversary A:
1. Init: A submits two vectors~x0,~x1 ∈ Σℓ.
2. Setup: C runs the setup algorithm and keeps the secret key SK to itself, then it gives the public key
PK to A.
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3. Query 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of tokens for vectors ~σ1, . . . ,~σq1 that correspond
to predicates f~σ1 , . . . , f~σq1 subject to the restriction that f~σi(~x0) = f~σi(~x1) for all i. In responses, C gives
the corresponding tokens T K~σi to A.
4. Challenge: A submits two messages M0,M1 subject to the restriction that if there is an index i such
that f~σi(~x0) = f~σi(~x1) = 1 then M0 = M1. C chooses a random coin γ and gives a ciphertext CT of
(~xγ ,Mγ) to A.
5. Query 2: A continues to request tokens for vectors ~σq1+1, . . . ,~σq that correspond to predicates f~σq1+1 ,
. . . , f~σq subject to the two restrictions as before.
6. Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvHV EA (1λ ) =
∣∣Pr[γ = γ ′]− 1/2∣∣ where the probability is taken over
the coin tosses made by A and C. We say that an HVE scheme is selectively secure if all probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
2.2 Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Let G and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime p order. Let g be a generator of G. The bilinear map
e : G×G→GT has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u,v ∈G and ∀a,b ∈ Zp, e(ua,vb) = e(u,v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g such that e(g,g) has order p, that is, e(g,g) is a generator of GT .
We say that (p,G,GT ,e) are bilinear groups if the group operations in G and GT as well as the bilinear map
e are all efficiently computable.
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
We introduce two simple assumptions under prime order bilinear groups. The decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman assumption was introduced in [4]. The parallel 3-party Diffie-Hellman (P3DH) assumption is
newly introduced in this paper.
Assumption 1 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, DBDH). Let (p,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilin-
ear group of prime order p. The DBDH problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g,ga,gb,gc
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)abc or T = T1 = e(g,g)d with random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp. The
advantage ofA is defined as AdvDBDHA (1λ ) =
∣∣Pr[A(D,T0) = 1
]
−Pr
[
A(D,T1) = 1
]∣∣ where the probability
is taken over the random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp and the random bits used by A. We say that the DBDH
assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the above problem.
Assumption 2 (Parallel 3-party Diffie-Hellman, P3DH). Let (p,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear
group of prime order p. The P3DH problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), (g, f ),(ga, f a),(gb, f b),(gab f z1 ,gz1),(gabc f z2 ,gz2)
)
and T,
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decides whether T = T0 = (gc f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (gd f z3 ,gz3) with random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp and
z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp. The advantage of A is defined as AdvP3DHA (1λ ) =
∣∣Pr[A(D,T0) = 1
]
−Pr
[
A(D,T1) = 1
]∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a,b,c,d,z1,z2,z3 and the random bits used by A.
We say that the P3DH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the
above problem.
Remark 1. The P3DH problem can be modified as follows: given a challenge tuple D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), (g, f ),
(ga, f a),(gb, f b),(gab f z1 ,gz1),(gc f z2 ,gz2)) and T , decides whether T = T0 = (gabc f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 =
(gd f z3 ,gz3). However, this modified one is the same as the original one by changing the position of the
challenge tuple as D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), (g, f ),(ga, f a),(gb, f b),(gab f z1 ,gz1),T
)
and T ′ = (gc f z2 ,gz2), Thus,
we will use any one of challenge tuple forms for the P3DH assumption.
3 Our Techniques
The basic idea to convert HVE schemes from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear groups
is to use bilinear product groups that are extended from bilinear groups using the direct product opera-
tion. Bilinear product groups were widely used in dual system encryption of Waters [17, 24], private linear
broadcast encryption of Garg et al. [10], and the conversion method of Freeman [9]. The product groups
extended from multiplicative cyclic groups represent an exponent as a vector. Thus vector operations in
product groups and bilinear product groups should be defined. Definition 3.1 and Definition 3.2 define the
vector operations in product groups and bilinear product groups, respectively.
Definition 3.1 (Vector Operations). Let G be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime p order. Let g be a
generator of G. We define vector operations over G as follows:
1. For a vector~b = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Znp, define g
~b := (gb1 , . . . ,gbn) ∈Gn.
2. For a vector~b = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Znp and a scalar c ∈ Zp, define (g
~b)c := (gb1c, . . . ,gbnc) ∈Gn.
3. For two vectors ~a = (a1, . . . ,an),~b = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Znp, define g~ag
~b := (ga1+b1 , . . . ,gan+bn) ∈Gn.
Definition 3.2 (Bilinear Product Groups). Let (p,G,GT ,e) be bilinear groups of prime order. Let g be a
generator of G. For integers n and m, the bilinear product groups ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1 , . . . ,g~bm) of basis vectors
~b1, . . . ,~bm is defined as follows
1. The basis vectors~b1, . . . ,~bm are random vectors such that~bi = (bi,1, . . . ,bi,n) ∈ Znp.
2. The bilinear map e : Gn ×Gn → GT is defined as e(g~a,g~b) := ∏ni=1 e(gai ,gbi) = e(g,g)~a·~b where · is
the inner product operation.
To guarantee the correctness of cryptographic schemes in bilinear product groups, the orthogonal prop-
erty of composite order bilinear groups should be implemented in bilinear product groups. The previous
research [9, 10, 17, 24] showed that the orthogonal property can be implemented in bilinear product groups.
The idea is that the orthogonality between vectors can be defined using the inner-product operation such that
~x ·~y = 0 since the bilinear map provides the inner-product operation. Definition 3.3 define the orthogonality
in bilinear product groups.
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Definition 3.3 (Orthogonality). Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g~b1 , . . . ,g~bm) be bilinear product groups with n,m param-
eters. Let Gi,G j be subgroups spanned by g
~bi ,g~b j , respectively. That is, Gi = 〈g
~bi〉 and G j = 〈g
~b j 〉. Then the
two subgroups Gi and G j are orthogonal to each other if e(~A,~B) = 1 for all ~A ∈Gi and ~B ∈ G j.
The main idea of our method that converts HVE schemes from composite order bilinear groups to prime
order bilinear groups is that the previous HVE schemes [7, 16, 22] in composite order bilinear groups use
the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumption that is not a kind of the subgroup decision (SD)
assumption.
The SD assumption is to distinguish whether h ∈G or h ∈G1 where G is a group and G1 is a subgroup
of G [5]. In product groups Gn, a subgroup G is defined as a vector space spanned by some basis vectors
~b1, . . . ,~bm such that G = 〈g~b1 , . . . ,g~bm〉. If a subgroup is constructed from one basis vector, then the SD
assumption is related to the DDH assumption. If a subgroup is constructed from k number of basis vectors,
then the SD assumption is related to the decisional k-Linear (k-DLIN) assumption [9]. In symmetric bilinear
groups of prime order, a subgroup should be constructed from two basis vectors since the DDH assumption
is not valid [10,24]. If a subgroup is constructed from two basis vectors, then cryptographic schemes become
complicated and there is no generic conversion method from composite order groups to prime order groups.
In asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order, a subgroup can be constructed from one basis vector since the
DDH assumption is valid [9, 17]. If a subgroup is constructed from one basis vector, then there is a generic
conversion method of Freeman, but it only works in asymmetric bilinear groups.
The C3DH assumption is defined in Assumption 3. The notable properties of the C3DH assumption are
that the target value T is always an element of Gp1 p2 in contrast to the SD assumption, and the subgroup
Gp2 plays the role of random blinding. From these properties of the C3DH assumption, it is possible to
use just one basis vector to construct a subgroup. Additionally, it is possible to use simple basis vectors for
cryptographic schemes since ciphertexts and tokens can use different subgroups that are not orthogonal.
Assumption 3 (Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman, C3DH). Let (N,G,GT ,e) be a description of bilinear
groups of composite order N = p1 · · · pm where pi is a random prime. Let gpi be a generator of the subgroup
Gpi . The C3DH assumption is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
~D =
(
(N,G,GT ,e),gp1 , . . . ,gpm ,g
a
p1 ,g
b
p1 ,g
ab
p1 R1,g
abc
p1 R2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = gcp1 R3 or T = T1 = g
d
p1 R3 with random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp1 and R1,R2,R3 ∈
Gp2 .
For instance, we select basis vectors ~b1,1 = (1,0),~b1,2 = (1,a),~b2 = (a,−1) for the conversion from
bilinear groups of composite N = p1 p2 order. For the conversion from bilinear groups of composite
N = p1 p2 p3 order, we select basis vectors ~b1,1 = (1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 =
(a1,a3,−1). Although different basis vectors were selected, the assumption for the security proof is the
simple one that is independent of basis vectors.
4 Conversion 1: BW-HVE
In this section, we convert the HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters [7] in composite order bilinear groups to
an HVE scheme in prime order bilinear groups and prove its selective security under the DBDH and P3DH
assumptions.
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4.1 Construction
Setup(1λ , ℓ): It first generates the bilinear group G of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses a
random value a ∈ Zp and sets basis vectors for bilinear product groups as ~b1,1 = (1,0), ~b1,2 =
(1,a), ~b2 = (a,−1). It also sets ~B1,1 = g
~b1,1 ,~B1,2 = g
~b1,2 ,~B2 = g
~b2
. It selects random exponents
v′,{u′i,h′i,w′i}ℓi=1,α ∈ Zp, zv,{zu,i,zh,i,zw,i}ℓi=1 ∈ Zp and outputs a secret key and a public key as
SK =
(
~Vk = ~Bv
′
1,2,
{
~Uk,i = ~B
u′i
1,2,
~Hk,i = ~B
h′i
1,2,
~Wk,i = ~B
w′i
1,2
}ℓ
i=1,
~Bα1,2
)
,
PK =
(
~B1,1, ~B1,2, ~B2, ~Vc = ~Bv
′
1,1~B
zv
2 ,
{
~Uc,i = ~B
u′i
1,1
~Bzu,i2 , ~Hc,i = ~B
h′i
1,1
~Bzh,i2 , ~Wc,i = ~B
w′i
1,1
~Bzw,i2
}ℓ
i=1,
Ω = e(~Bv′1,1,~B1,2)α
)
.
GenToken(~σ ,SK,PK): It takes as input a vector ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σℓ) ∈ Σℓ∗, the secret key SK, and the public
key PK. Let S be the set of indexes that are not wild-card fields in the vector ~σ . It selects random
exponents {r1,i,r2,i}i∈S ∈ Zp and outputs a token as
T K~σ =
(
~K1 = ~Bα1,2 ∏
i∈S
(
~Uσik,i~Hk,i
)r1,i~W r2,ik,i ,
{
~K2,i =~V
−r1,i
k ,
~K3,i =~V
−r2,i
k
}
i∈S
)
.
Encrypt(~x,M,PK): It takes as input a vector ~x = (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ Σℓ, a message M ∈M, and the public key
PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and random blinding values z1,{z2,i,z3,i}ℓi=1 ∈ Zp.
Then it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C0 = ΩtM, ~C1 =~V tc~B
z1
2 ,
{
~C2,i = (~U xic,i~Hc,i)
t~Bz2,i2 , ~C3,i = ~W
t
c,i~B
z3,i
2
}ℓ
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK): It takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token T K~σ of a vector ~σ . It first computes
M ←C0 ·
(
e(~C1, ~K1) ·∏
i∈S
e(~C2,i, ~K2,i) · e(~C3,i, ~K3,i)
)−1
.
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate f~σ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate f~σ is satisfied.
4.2 Correctness
If f~σ (~x) = 1, then the following calculation shows that Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) = M using the orthogonality
of basis vectors such that e(g~b2 ,g~b1,2) = 1.
e(~C1, ~K1) ·∏
i∈S
(
e(~C2,i, ~K2,i) · e(~C3,i, ~K3,i)
)
= e(~V tc ,~Bα1,2 ∏
i∈S
(~Uσik,i~Hk,i)
r1,i~W r2,ik,i ) ·∏
i∈S
e((~U xic,i~Hc,i)
t ,~V−r1,ik ) · e(~W
t
c,i,~V
−r2,i
k )
= e(~Bv
′t
1,1,~B
α
1,2) ·∏
i∈S
e(gv
′
,gu
′
i(σi−xi))t·r1,i = e(~Bv
′
1,1,~B1,2)
αt .
Otherwise, that is f~σ (~x) = 0, then the probability of Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M|
to less than |GT |1/4.
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4.3 Security
Theorem 4.1. The above HVE scheme is selectively secure under the DBDH and P3DH assumptions.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is easily obtained from the following four Lemmas 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
Before presenting the four lemmas, we first introduce the following three assumptions. The HVE scheme of
Boneh and Waters constructed in bilinear groups of composite order N = p1 p2, and its security was proven
under the DBDH, bilinear subgroup decision (BSD), and C3DH assumptions [7]. These assumptions in
composite order bilinear groups are converted to the following Assumptions 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 using our
conversion method.
Assumption 4-1 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors ~b1,1 =
(1,0),~b1,2 = (1,a),~b2 = (a,−1). The Assumption 4-1 is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)d with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 4-2 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors ~b1,1 =
(1,0),~b1,2 = (1,a),~b2 = (a,−1). The Assumption 4-2 is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e((g
~b1,1)c1(g~b2)c3 ,(g~b1,2)c2) or T = T1 = e((g
~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2) with random choices
of c1,c2,c3 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 4-3 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors ~b1,1 =
(1,0),~b1,2 = (1,a),~b2 = (a,−1). The Assumption 4-3 is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2(g~b2)z1 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2c3(g~b2)z2
)
and ~T ,
decides whether T = T0 =(g
~b1,1)c3(g~b2)z3 or T = T1 =(g
~b1,1)d(g~b2)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈Zp
and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Lemma 4.2. The above HVE scheme is selectively secure under the Assumptions 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is directly obtained from [7] since the Assumptions 4-1, 4-2, and 4-2 in
prime order bilinear groups are correspond to the DBDH, BSD, and C3DH assumptions in composite order
bilinear groups. That is, the proof of [7] can be exactly simulated using the vector operations in the Definition
3.1 and the Assumptions 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.
Lemma 4.3. If the DBDH assumption holds, then the Assumption 4-1 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 4-1 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G,GT ,e),g,gc1 ,gc2 ,gc3) and T where T = T0 = e(g,g)c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)d . B first chooses random
values a ∈ Zp and computes
g~b1,1 = (g,1), g~b1,2 = (g,ga), g~b2 = (ga,g−1),
(g~b1,1)c1 = (gc1 ,1), (g~b1,1)c2 = (gc2 ,1), (g~b1,1)c3 = (gc3 ,1),
(g~b1,2)c1 = (gc1 ,(gc1)a), (g~b1,2)c2 = (gc2 ,(gc2)a).
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Next, it gives the tuple D′= ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c3) and T
to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of A is ε , then the advantage of B is
greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal to the Assumption 4-1.
Lemma 4.4. The Assumption 4-2 holds for all adversaries.
Proof. The equation e((g~b1,1)c1(g~b2)c3 ,(g~b1,2)c2) = e((g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2) holds by the orthogonality of basis
vectors such that e(g~b2 ,g~b1,2) = 1. Therefore, any adversary can not break the Assumption 4-2.
Lemma 4.5. If the P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 4-3 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 4-3 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(gc1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc1c2c3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T where T = T0 = (gc3 f z3 ,gz3)
or T = T1 = (gd f z3 ,gz3). B first computes
g~b1,1 = (g,1), g~b1,2 = (g, f ), g~b2 = ( f ,g−1),
(g~b1,2)c1 = (gc1 , f c1), (g~b1,2)c2 = (gc2 , f c2),
(g~b1,1)c1c2(g~b2)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gz1)−1), (g~b1,1)c1c2c3(g~b2)z2 = (gc1c2c3 f z2 ,(gz2)−1).
Intuitively, it sets a = log f . Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,
(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2c3) and T to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of
A is ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal to
the Assumption 4-3.
5 Conversion 2: SW-dHVE
In this section, we convert the delegatable HVE scheme of Shi and Waters [22] to prime order bilinear
groups and prove its selective security under the DBDH and P3DH assumptions.
5.1 Construction
Let Σ be a finite set of attributes and let ?,∗ be two special symbol not in Σ. Define Σ?,∗ = Σ∪{?,∗}. The
symbol ? denotes a delegatable field, i.e., a field where one is allowed to fill in an arbitrary value and perform
delegation. The symbol ∗ denotes a wild-card field or “don’t care” field.
Setup(1λ , ℓ): It first generates the bilinear group G of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random
values a1,a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets basis vectors for bilinear product groups as ~b1,1 = (1,0,a1), ~b1,2 =
(1,a2,0), ~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2−a3), ~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). It also sets
~B1,1 = g
~b1,1 , ~B1,2 = g
~b1,2 , ~B2 = g
~b2 , ~B3 = g
~b3 .
It selects random exponents v′,w′1,w′2,{u′i,h′i}ℓi=1,α ∈ Zp, zv,zw,1,zw,2,{zu,i,zh,i}ℓi=1 ∈ Zp and outputs
a secret key and a public key as
SK =
(
~Vk = ~Bv
′
1,2, ~Wk,1 = ~B
w′1
1,2,
~Wk,2 = ~B
w′2
1,2,
{
~Uk,i = ~B
u′i
1,2,
~Hk,i = ~B
h′i
1,2
}ℓ
i=1,
~Bα1,2
)
,
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PK =
(
~B1,1, ~B1,2, ~B2, ~B3, ~Vc = ~Bv
′
1,1~B
zv
2 ,
~Wc,1 = ~B
w′1
1,1
~Bzw,12 , ~Wc,2 = ~B
w′2
1,2
~Bzw,22 ,
{
~Uc,i = ~B
u′i
1,1
~Bzu,i2 , ~Hc,i = ~B
h′i
1,1
~Bzh,i2
}ℓ
i=1, Ω = e(~B
v′
1,1,~B1,2)
α
)
.
GenToken(~σ ,SK,PK): It takes as input an attribute vector ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σℓ) ∈ Σℓ?,∗ and the secret key SK.
1. Let S be the set of indexes that are not delegatable fields and wild-card fields in the vector ~σ . It
first selects random exponents r1,r2,{r3,i}i∈S ∈Zp and random blinding values y1,y2,y3,{y4,i}i∈S ∈
Zp. Then it computes decryption components as
~K1 = ~Bα1,2~W
r1
k,1
~W r2k,2 ∏
i∈S
(~Uσik,i~Hk,i)
r3,i~By13 , ~K2 =~V
−r1
k
~By23 , ~K3 =~V
−r2
k
~By33 ,
{
~K4,i =~V
−r3,i
k
~By4,i3
}
i∈S.
2. Let S? be the set of indexes that are delegatable fields. It selects random exponents {s1, j,s2, j,
{s3, j,i}} ∈ Zp and random blinding values {y1, j,u,y1, j,h,y2, j,y3, j,{y4, j,i}} ∈ Zp. Next, it com-
putes delegation components as
∀ j ∈ S? : ~L1, j,u = ~U s3, j, jk,i ~B
y1, j,u
3 ,
~L1, j,h = ~W
s1, j
k,1
~W s2, jk,2 ∏
i∈S
(~Uσik,i~Hk,i)
s3, j,i ~Hs3, j, jk, j ~B
y1, j,h
3 ,
~L2, j =~V
−s1, j
k
~By2, j3 , ~L3, j =~V
−s2, j
k
~By3, j3 ,
{
~L4, j,i =~V
−s3, j,i
k
~By4, j,i3
}
i∈S∪{ j}.
3. Finally, it outputs a token as
T K~σ =
(
~K1, ~K2, ~K3, {~K4,i}i∈S,
{
~L1, j,u, ~L1, j,h, ~L2, j, ~L3, j, {~L4, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}
}
j∈S?
)
.
Delegate(~σ ′,T K~σ ,PK): It takes as input an attribute vector ~σ ′= (σ1, . . . ,σℓ)∈ Σℓ?,∗ and a token T K~σ . With-
out loss of generality, we assume that σ ′ fixes only one delegatable field of σ . It is clear that we can
perform delegation on multiple fields if we have an algorithm to perform delegation on one field.
Suppose σ ′ fixes the k-th index of σ .
1. If the k-th index of σ ′ is set to ∗, that is, a wild-card field, then it can perform delegation by
simply removing the delegation components that correspond to k-th index.
2. Otherwise, that is, if the k-th index of σ ′ is set to some value in Σ, then it perform delegation as
follows:
(a) Let S be the set of indexes that are not delegatable fields and wild-card fields in the vector
~σ ′. Note that k ∈ S. It selects random exponents µ ,y1,y2,y3,{y4,i}i∈S ∈ Zp and updates the
token as
~K′1 = ~K1(~L
σk
1,k,u
~L1,k,h)µ~By13 , ~K
′
2 = ~K2~L
µ
2,k
~By23 , ~K
′
3 = ~K3~L
µ
3,k
~By33 ,
~K′4,k =~L
µ
4,k,k
~By4,k3 ,
{
~K′4,i = ~K4,i~L
µ
4,k,i
~By4,i3
}
i∈S\{k}.
(b) Let S? be the set of indexes that are delegatable fields in the vector ~σ ′. It selects random ex-
ponents {τ j,y1, j,u,y1, j,h,y2, j,y3, j,{y4, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}} j∈S? ∈ Zp and re-randomize the delegation
components of the token as
∀ j ∈ S? : ~L′1, j,u =~Lµ1, j,u~B
y1, j,u
3 ,
~L′1, j,h =~L
µ
1, j,h(~L
σk
1,k,u
~L1,k,h)τ j~B
y1, j,h
3 ,
~L′2, j =~L
µ
2, j~L
τ j
2, j~B
y2, j
3 ,
~L′3, j =~L
µ
3, j~L
τ j
3, j~B
y3, j
3 ,
~L′4, j, j =~L
µ
4, j, j~B
y4, j, j
3 ,
~L′4, j,k =~L
τ j
4, j,k~B
y4, j,k
3 ,
{
~L′4, j,i =~L
µ
4, j,i~L
τ j
4, j,k~B
y4, j,i
3
}
i∈S\{k}.
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(c) Finally, it outputs a token as
T K~σ ′ =
(
~K′1, ~K
′
2, ~K
′
3, {~K
′
4,i}i∈S,
{
~L′1, j,h,~L
′
1, j,u, ~L
′
2, j, ~L
′
3, j, {~L
′
4, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}
}
j∈S?
)
.
Encrypt(~x,M,PK): It takes as input an attribute vector ~x = (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ Σℓ, a message M ∈ M ⊆ GT ,
and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and random blinding values
z1,z2,z3,{z4,i}
ℓ
i=1 ∈ Zp. Then it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C0 = ΩtM, ~C1 =~V tc~B
z1
2 ,
~C2 = ~W tc,1~B
z2
2 ,
~C3 = ~W tc,2~B
z3
2 ,
{
~C4,i = (~U xic,i~Hc,i)
t~Bz4,i2
}l
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK): It takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token T K~σ of a vector ~σ . It first computes
M ←C0 ·
(
e(~C1, ~K1) · e(~C2, ~K2) · e(~C3, ~K3) ·∏
i∈S
e(~C4,i, ~K4,i)
)−1
.
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate f~σ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate f~σ is satisfied.
5.2 Correctness
If f~σ (~x) = 1, then the following calculation shows that Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) = M by the orthogonality of
basis vectors such that e(g~b1,1 ,g~b3) = 1,e(g~b1,2 ,g~b2) = 1,e(g~b2 ,g~b3) = 1.
e(~C1, ~K1) · e(~C2, ~K2) · e(~C3, ~K3) ·∏
i∈S
e(~C4,i, ~K4,i)
= e((~Vc)t ,~Bα1,2~W
r1
k,1
~W r2k,2 ∏
i∈S
(~Uσic,i~Hc,i)
r3,i) · e(~W tc,1,~V
−r1
k ) · e(
~W tc,2,~V
−r2
k ) ·∏
i∈S
e((~U xic,i~Hc,i)
t ,~V−r3,ik )
= e(~Bv
′t
1,1,~B
α
1,2) ·∏
i∈S
e(gv
′
,gu
′
i(σi−xi))tr3,i = e(~Bv
′
1,1,~B1,2)
αt .
Otherwise, that is f~σ (~x) = 0, the probability of Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M| to
less than |GT |1/4.
5.3 Security
Theorem 5.1. The above dHVE scheme is selectively secure under the DBDH and P3DH assumptions.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is easily obtained from the following five Lemmas 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and
5.6. Before presenting the five lemmas, we first introduce the following four assumptions. The HVE scheme
of Shi and Waters constructed in bilinear groups of composite order N = p1 p2 p3, and its security was
proven under the DBDH, BSD, and C3DH assumptions [22]. In composite order bilinear groups, the C3DH
assumption imply the l-C3DH assumption that was introduced in [22]. However, this implication is not
valid in prime order bilinear groups since the basis vectors for ciphertexts and tokens are different. Thus
the C3DH assumption for ciphertexts and the C3DH assumption for tokens should be treated as differently.
These assumptions in composite order bilinear groups are converted to the following Assumptions 5-1, 5-2,
5-3, and 5-4 using our conversion method.
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Assumption 5-1 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5-1 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)d with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5-2 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5-2 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e((g
~b1,1)c1(g~b2)c3 ,(g~b1,2)c2(g~b3)c4) or T = T1 = e((g
~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2) with random
choices of c1,c2,c3,c4 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5-3 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5-3 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2(g~b2)z1 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2c3(g~b2)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
~b1,1)c3(g~b2)z3 or T = T1 = (g
~b1,1)d(g~b2)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈
Zp, and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5-4 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5-4 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,(g~b1,2)c1c2(g~b3)z1 ,(g~b1,2)c1c2c3(g~b3)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
~b1,2)c3(g~b3)z3 or T = T1 = (g
~b1,2)d(g~b3)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈
Zp, and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Lemma 5.2. The above dHVE scheme is selectively secure under the Assumptions 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is directly obtained from [22] since the Assumptions 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4
in prime order bilinear groups are correspond to the DBDH, BSD, C3DH (for ciphertexts), and C3DH (for
tokens) assumptions in composite order bilinear groups.
Lemma 5.3. If the DBDH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5-1 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5-1 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G,GT ,e),g,gc1 ,gc2 ,gc3) and T where T = T0 = e(g,g)c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)d . B first chooses random
values a1,a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
g~b1,1 = (g,1,ga1), g~b1,2 = (g,ga2 ,1), g~b2 = (ga2 ,g−1,ga1a2−a3), g~b3 = (ga1 ,ga3 ,g−1),
(g~b1,1)c1 = (gc1 ,1,(gc1 )a1), (g~b1,1)c2 = (gc2 ,1,(gc2 )a1), (g~b1,1)c3 = (gc3 ,1),
(g~b1,2)c1 = (gc1 ,(gc1)a2 ,1), (g~b1,2)c2 = (gc2 ,(gc2)a2 ,1).
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Next, it gives the tuple D′= ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c3) and T
to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of A is ε , then the advantage of B is
greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal to the Assumption 5-1.
Lemma 5.4. The Assumption 5-2 holds for all adversaries.
Proof. The equation e((g~b1,1)c1(g~b2)c3 ,(g~b1,2)c2(g~b3)c4) = e((g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2) holds by the orthogonality of
basis vectors such that e(g~b1,1 ,g~b3) = 1,e(g~b2 ,g~b1,2) = 1,e(g~b2 ,g~b3) = 1. Therefore, any adversary can not
break the Assumption 5-2.
Lemma 5.5. If the P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5-3 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5-3 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(gc1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc1c2c3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T = Tγ = (Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2) where T =
T0 = (gc3 f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (gd f z3 ,gz3). B first chooses random values a1,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
g~b1,1 = (g,1,ga1 ), g~b1,2 = (g, f ,1), g~b2 = ( f ,g−1, f a1 g−a3), g~b3 = (ga1 ,ga3 ,g−1),
(g~b1,2)c1 = (gc1 , f c1 ,1), (g~b1,2)c2 = (gc2 , f c2 ,1),
(g~b1,1)c1c2(g~b2)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gz1)−1,(gc1c2 f z1)a1(gz1)−a3),
(g~b1,1)c1c2c3(g~b2)z2 = (gc1c2c3 f z2 ,(gz2)−1,(gc1c2c3 f z2)a1(gz2)−a3),
T ′ = (Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2,(Tγ ,1)a1(Tγ ,2)−a3).
Intuitively, it sets a2 = log f . Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,
(g~b1,1)c1c2(g~b2)z1 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2c3(g~b2)z2) and T ′ to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the
advantage of A is ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to
A is equal to the Assumption 5-3.
Lemma 5.6. If the P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5-4 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5-4 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(gc1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc1c2c3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T = Tγ =(Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2)where T0 =
(gc3 f z3 ,gz3) or T1 = (gd f z3 ,gz3). B first chooses random values a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
g~b1,1 = (g,1, f ), g~b1,2 = (g,ga2 ,1), g~b2 = (ga2 ,g−1,ga3), g~b3 = ( f , f a2 g−a3 ,g−1),
(g~b1,1)c1 = (gc1 ,1, f c1), (g~b1,1)c2 = (gc2 ,1, f c2),
(g~b1,2)c1c2(g~b3)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gc1c2 f z1)a2(gz1)−a3 ,(gz1)−1),
(g~b1,2)c1c2c3(g~b3)z2 = (gc1c2c3 f z2 ,(gc1c2c3 f z2)a2(gz2)−a3 ,(gz2)−1),
T ′ = (Tγ ,1,(Tγ ,1)a2(Tγ ,2)−a3 ,(Tγ ,2)−1).
Intuitively, it sets a′1 = log f ,a′2 = a2,a′3 = a1a2 − a3 where a′1,a′2,a′3 are elements of basis vectors for the
Assumption 5-4. Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,(g~b1,2)c1c2 ·
(g~b3)z1 ,(g~b1,2)c1c2c3(g~b3)z2) and T ′ to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of A
is ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal to
the Assumption 5-4.
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6 Conversion 3: LL-HVE
In this section, we convert the HVE scheme of Lee and Lee [16] to prime order bilinear groups and prove
its selective security under the DBDH and P3DH assumptions.
6.1 Construction
Setup(1λ , ℓ): It generates the bilinear group G of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random
values a1,a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets basis vectors for bilinear product groups as ~b1,1 = (1,0,a1), ~b1,2 =
(1,a2,0), ~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2−a3), ~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). It also sets
~B1,1 = g
~b1,1 , ~B1,2 = g
~b1,2 , ~B2 = g
~b2 , ~B3 = g
~b3 .
It selects random exponents v′,w′1,w′2,{u′i,hi}ℓi=1,α ∈ Zp, zv,zw,1,zw,2,{zu,i,zh,i}ℓi=1 ∈ Zp and outputs
a secret key and a public key as
SK =
(
Vk = ~Bv
′
1,2,Wk,1 = ~B
w′1
1,2,Wk,2 = ~B
w′2
1,2,
{
Uk,i = ~B
u′i
1,2,Hk,i = ~B
h′i
1,2
}ℓ
i=1,
~Bα1,2
)
,
PK =
(
~B1,1, ~B1,2, ~B2, ~B3, ~Vc = ~Bv
′
1,1~B
zv
2 ,
~Wc,1 = ~B
w′1
1,1
~Bzw,12 , ~Wc,2 = ~B
w′2
1,1
~Bzw,22 ,
{
~Uc,i = ~B
u′i
1,1
~Bzu,i2 , ~Hc,i = ~B
h′i
1,1
~Bzh,i2
}ℓ
i=1, Ω = e(~B
v′
1,1,~B1,2)
α
)
.
GenToken(~σ ,SK,PK): It takes as input a vector ~σ = (σ1, . . . ,σℓ) ∈ Σℓ∗ and the secret key SK. Let S be the
set of indexes that are not wild-card fields in the vector ~σ . It selects random exponents r1,r2,r3 ∈ Zp
and random blinding values y1,y2,y3,y4 ∈ Zp. Next it outputs a token as
T K~σ =
(
~K1 = ~Bα1,2~W
r1
k,1
~W r2k,2 ∏
i∈S
(~Uσik,i~Hk,i)
r3~By13 , ~K2 =~V
−r1
k
~By23 , ~K3 =~V
−r2
k
~By33 , ~K4 =~V
−r3
k
~By43
)
.
Encrypt(~x,M,PK): It takes as input a vector ~x = (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ Σl , a message M ∈M, and the public key
PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and random blinding values z1,z2,z3,{z4,i}ℓi=1 ∈ Zp.
Then it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C0 = ΩtM, ~C1 =~V tc~B
z1
2 ,
~C2 = ~W tc,1~B
z2
2 ,
~C3 = ~W tc,2~B
z3
2 ,
{
~C4,i = (~U xic,i~Hc,i)
t~Bz4,i2
}ℓ
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK): It takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token T K~σ of a vector ~σ . It first computes
M ←C0 ·
(
e(~C1, ~K1) · e(~C2, ~K2) · e(~C3, ~K3) · e(∏
i∈S
~C4,i, ~K4)
)−1
.
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate f~σ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate f~σ is satisfied.
6.2 Correctness
If f~σ (~x) = 1, then the following calculation shows that Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) = M by the orthogonality of
basis vectors such that e(g~b1,1 ,g~b3) = 1,e(g~b1,2 ,g~b2) = 1,e(g~b2 ,g~b3) = 1.
e(~C1, ~K1) · e(~C2, ~K2) · e(~C3, ~K3) · e(∏
i∈S
~C4,i, ~K4)
= e(~V tc ,~Bα1,2~W
r1
k,1
~W r2k,2 ∏
i∈S
(~Uσik,i~Hk,i)
r3) · e(~W tc,1,~V
−r1
k ) · e(
~W tc,2,~V
−r2
k ) · e(∏
i∈S
(~U xic,i~Hc,i)
t ,~V−r3k )
= e(~Bv
′t
1,1,~B
α
1,2) · e(g
v′ ,∏
i∈S
gu
′
i(σi−xi))tr3 = e(~Bv
′
1,1,~B1,2)
αt .
Otherwise, that is f~σ (~x) = 0, the probability of Query(CT,T K~σ ,PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M| to
less than |GT |1/4.
6.3 Security
Theorem 6.1. The above HVE scheme is selectively secure under the DBDH and P3DH assumptions.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is easily obtained from the following five Lemmas 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5
and 6.6. Before presenting the five lemmas, we first introduce the following four assumptions. The HVE
scheme of Lee and Lee constructed in bilinear groups of composite order N = p1 p2 p3, and its security
was proven under the DBDH, BSD, and C3DH assumptions [22]. In composite order bilinear groups, the
C3DH assumption imply the C2DH assumption that was introduced in [16]. However, this implication is
not valid in prime order bilinear groups since the basis vectors for ciphertexts and tokens are different. Thus
the C3DH assumption for ciphertexts and the C2DH assumption for tokens should be treated as differently.
These assumptions in composite order bilinear groups are converted to the following Assumptions 6-1, 6-2,
6-3, and 6-4 using our conversion method.
Assumption 6-1 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 6-1 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,1)c2 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)d with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 6-2 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 6-2 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e((g~b1,1)c1(g~b2)c3 ,(g~b1,2)c2(g~b3)c4) or T = T1 = e((g~b1,1)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2) with random
choices of c1,c2,c3,c4 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 6-3 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 6-3 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,2)c1 ,(g~b1,2)c2 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2(g~b2)z1 ,(g~b1,1)c1c2c3(g~b2)z2
)
and T,
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decides whether T = T0 =(g
~b1,1)c3(g~b2)z3 or T = T1 =(g
~b1,1)d(g~b2)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈Zp
and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 6-4 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors~b1,1 =
(1,0,a1),~b1,2 = (1,a2,0),~b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3),~b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 6-4 is stated as fol-
lows: given a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,(g~b1,2)c1(g~b3)z1 ,(g~b1,2)c2(g~b3)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
~b1,2)c1c2(g~b3)z3 or T = T1 = (g
~b1,2)d(g~b3)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,d ∈ Zp
and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Lemma 6.2. The above HVE scheme is selectively secure under the Assumptions 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is directly obtained from [16] since the Assumptions 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, and
6-4 in prime order bilinear groups are corresponds to the DBDH, BSD, C3DH, and C2DH assumptions in
composite order bilinear groups.
Lemma 6.3. If the DBDH assumption holds, then the Assumption 6-1 also holds.
Lemma 6.4. The Assumption 6-2 holds for all adversaries.
Lemma 6.5. If the P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 6-3 also holds.
The Assumptions 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 are the same as the Assumptions 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3. Thus we omits the
proofs of Lemmas 6.3, 6.4, 6.5.
Lemma 6.6. If the P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 6-4 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 6-4 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(gc1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T = Tγ = (Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2) where T =
T0 = (gc1c2c3 f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (gd f z3 ,gz3). B first chooses random values a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
g~b1,1 = (g,1, f ), g~b1,2 = (g,ga2 ,1), g~b2 = (ga2 ,g−1,ga3), g~b3 = ( f , f a2 g−a3 ,g−1),
(g~b1,2)c
′
1(g~b3)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gc1c2 f z1)a2(gz1)−a3 ,(gz1)−1),
(g~b1,2)c
′
2(g~b3)z2 = (gc3 f z2 ,(gc3 f z2)a2(gz2)−a3 ,(gz2)−1),
T ′ = (Tγ ,1,(Tγ ,1)a2(Tγ ,2)−a3 ,(Tγ ,2)−1).
Intuitively, it sets a′1 = log f ,a′2 = a2,a′3 = a1a2 − a3 and c′1 = c1c2,c′2 = c3 where a′1,a′2,a′3 are elements
of basis vectors for the Assumption 6-4. Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g
~b1,1 ,g~b1,2 ,g~b2 ,g~b3 ,
(g~b1,1)c′1(g~b2)z1 ,(g~b1,1)c′2(g~b2)z2) and T ′ to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage
of A is ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal
to the Assumption 6-4.
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7 Conclusion
We converted the HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters, the delegatable HVE scheme of Shi and Waters, and the
efficient HVE scheme of Lee and Lee from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear groups.
Though we used our conversion method to HVE schemes that based on the decisional C3DH assumption, it
would be possible to use our method to other scheme in composite order bilinear groups that based on the
decisional C3DH assumption.
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A Generic Group Model
In this section, we show that the P3DH assumption holds in the generic group model. The generic group
model introduced by Shoup [23] is a tool for analyzing generic algorithms that work independently of the
group representation.
A.1 Master Theorem
We generalize the master theorem of Katz et al. [14] to use prime order bilinear groups instead of composite
order bilinear groups and to use multiple groups elements in the target instead of just one element.
Let G,GT be cyclic bilinear groups of order p where p is a large prime. The bilinear map is defined
as e : G×G→ GT . In the generic group model, a random group element of G,GT is represented as a
random variable Pi,Ri respectively where Pi,Ri are chosen uniformly in Zp. We say that a random variable
has degree t if the maximum degree of any variable is t. Then we can naturally define the dependence and
independence of random variables as in Definition A.1.
Definition A.1. Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pu}, T0 = {T0,1, . . . ,T0,m}, T1 = {T1,1, . . . ,T1,m} be random variables over
G where T0,i 6= T1,i for all 1 ≤ i≤ m, and let R = {R1, . . . ,Rv} be random variables over GT . We say that Tb
is dependent on A if there exists constants {αi},{βi} such that
m
∑
i
αiTb,i =
u
∑
i
βi ·Pi
where αi 6= 0 for at least one i. We say that Tb is independent of P if Tb is not dependent on P.
Let S1 = {(i, j) | e(T0,i,T0, j) 6= e(T1,i,T1, j)} and S2 = {(i, j) | e(T0,i,Pj) 6= e(T1,i,Pj)}. We say that
{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1 ∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is dependent on P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1 ∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 if
there exist constants {αi, j},{α ′i, j},{βi, j},{β ′i, j},{γi, j},{δi} such that
∑
(i, j)∈S1
αi, j · e(Tb,i,Tb, j)+ ∑
(i, j)/∈S1
α ′i, j · e(Tb,i,Tb, j)+ ∑
(i, j)∈S2
βi, j · e(Tb,i,Pj)+ ∑
(i, j)/∈S2
β ′i, j · e(Tb,i,Pj)
=
u
∑
i
u
∑
j
γi, j · e(Pi,Pj)+
v
∑
i
δi ·Ri.
where αi, j 6= 0 for at least one (i, j)∈ S1 or βi, j 6= 0 for at least one (i, j)∈ S2. We say that {e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1∪
{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is independent of P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1 ∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 if {e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1
∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is not dependent on P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1 ∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 .
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Using the above dependence and independence of random variables, we can obtain the following theo-
rem from the master theorem of Katz et al. [14].
Theorem A.1. Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pu}, T0 = {T0,1, . . . ,T0,m}, T1 = {T1,1, . . . ,T1,m} be random variables over
G where T0,i 6= T1,i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and let R = {R1, . . . ,Rv} be random variables over GT . Consider the
following experiment in the generic group model:
An algorithm is given P = {P1, . . . ,Pu} and R = {R1, . . . ,Rv}. A random bit b is chosen, and
the adversary is given Tb = {Tb,1, . . . ,Tb,m}. The algorithm outputs a bit b′, and succeeds if
b′ = b. The algorithm’s advantage is the absolute value of the difference between its success
probability and 1/2.
Let S1 = {(i, j) | e(T0,i,T0, j) 6= e(T1,i,T1, j)} and S2 = {(i, j) | e(T0,i,Pj) 6= e(T1,i,Pj)}. If Tb is independent of P
for all b∈{0,1}, and {e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is independent of P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1∪
{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 for all b ∈ {0,1}, then any algorithm A issuing at most q instructions has an advantage
at most O(q2t/p).
Note that this theorem that is a slight modification of that of Katz et al. [14] still holds in prime order
bilinear groups since the dependent equation of an adversary can be used to distinguish the target Tb of
the assumption. Additionally, it still holds when the target consists of multiple group elements since the
adversary can only make a dependent equation in Definition A.1.
A.2 Analysis of P3DH Assumption
To analyze the P3DH assumption in the generic group model, we only need to show the independence of
T0,T1 random variables. Using the notation of previous section, the P3DH assumption can be written as
follows
P = {1,X ,A,XA,B,XB,AB+XZ1,Z1,C+XZ2,Z2}, R = {1}
T0 = {ABC+XZ3,Z3}, T1 = {D+XZ3,Z3}.
The T1 has a random variable D that does not exist in P. Thus the independence of T1 is easily obtained.
Therefore, we only need to consider the independence of T0. First, T0 is independent of P since T0 contains
Z3 that does not exist in P. For the independence of {e(T0,i,T0, j)}(i, j)∈S1 ∪{e(T0,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 , we should
define two sets S1,S2. We obtain that S1 = {(1,1),(1,2),(2,1),(2,2)}. However, e(T0,i,T0, j) contains Z23
because of Z3 in T0, and Z23 can not be obtained from the right part of the equation in Definition A.1. Thus,
the constants αi, j should be zero for all (i, j). From this, we obtain the simple equations as follows
∑
(i, j)∈S2
βi, j · e(Tb,i,Pj)+ ∑
(i, j)/∈S2
β ′i, j · e(Tb,i,Pj) =
u
∑
i
u
∑
j
γi, j · e(Pi,Pj)+
v
∑
i
δi ·Ri.
The set S2 is defined as {(i, j) | ∀i, j} because of D in T1. However, Z3 in T0 should be removed to
construct a dependent equation since Z3 does not exists in P,R. To remove Z3 from the left part of the above
simple equation, two random variables Y,XY should be paired with T0,i for some Y ∈ P. If Z3 is remove
in the left part of the above simple equation, then the left part has at least a degree 3 and it contains ABC.
To have a degree 3 in the right part of the above simple equation, AB+XZ1,Z1 should be used. However,
the right part of the above equation can not contain ABC since C,XC do not exist in P. Therefore, the
independence of T0 is obtained.
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